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Contractors as Military 
Professionals?
GARY SCHAUB, JR., and VOLKER FRANKE
As of 2008, nearly 200,000 private contractors supported or supple-mented military operations in Iraq, with about 30,000 of them provid-
ing security services. Today, civilian contractors working for the Pentagon 
outnumber uniformed forces in Afghanistan.1 Doug Brooks, president of 
the International Peace Operations Association, the private security indus-
try’s trade organization, suggests that the booming private security indus-
try is here to stay.2
Nations have employed civilian contractors to fulfill combat and 
combat support functions throughout history. But alarming to many observ-
ers is the rapid rise of a largely un- (or under-) controlled industry: from 
less than 15 percent of contractors among the Department of Defense’s 
workforce during World War II to more than 60 percent currently in Af-
ghanistan.3 Security contractors often work side-by-side with soldiers and 
sometimes take on roles traditionally performed by the military. Is the use 
of contractors compatible with the strong and pervasive professional mil-
itary ethos? What are the motivations, values, and attitudes of individuals 
who sign on with private security firms? Do they share norms, behavioral 
codes, and a professional identity? How do contractors view their profes-
sional status and relationship with traditional military forces? How do mil-
itary members view contractors?
Using survey methodology, we explore some of these questions. 
Specifically, we compare the attitudes of US military officers to those of se-
curity contractors with law-enforcement backgrounds who had completed 
at least one overseas deployment with a security firm and examine how the 
two groups view each other, their roles, and professional status.
We frame our analysis with a discussion of military professionalism 
in the United States and the extent to which employees of the private secu-
rity industry possess similar traits. Next, we present and compare the results 
of our research using samples of officers and contractors. Finally, we con-
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clude with a discussion of implications for the relationship between military 
professionals and security contractors in peace and stability operations.
The Military Profession and Civilian Contractors
What is a military professional? Are all members of the military pro-
fessionals? Are civilians who perform military duties professionals? Do they 
regard themselves as professionals? Are they regarded as such by officers? 
This section delineates the traits of the military profession and assesses the 
degree to which civilian contractors possess these traits.
Five decades ago, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz argued 
that military officers are professionals in the art of war and the manage-
ment of violence.4 Officers’ area of expertise is in the planning, organiz-
ing, and employment of military force. Huntington divided these tasks into 
two subfields: combat and command, and proficiency in “technical support 
(administration, comptroller, supply) and professional support (legal, reli-
gious, medical).”5 For Huntington, officers who mastered the technical or 
professional support area of military activity were not members of the mil-
itary profession because their expertise was split between the management 
of violence and technical or job-related knowledge, the latter of which was 
not unique to the military.6
Traditionally, it is in the technical and support categories where the 
employment of civilian contractors has been most prevalent. But contract 
employees have also penetrated into the realm of combat and command. In 
2008, an estimated 30,000 contractors provided security services in Iraq.7 
Of these, approximately three-quarters were armed, presenting the second 
largest armed force in Iraq, behind only the US military.8 At present, be-
tween 10,000 and 13,000 private security operatives are working on con-
tracts for the Department of Defense or Department of State, constituting 
approximately five percent of all US-funded contractor personnel.9
The military’s broad array of expert knowledge is organized to max-
imize its usefulness in tackling problems within the security arena, which is 
in flux at the margins as the profession expands its ambit and fends off or 
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accedes to jurisdictional challenges from other groups, including the pri-
vate sector.10 Nevertheless, professional military expertise still is predomi-
nant in resolving security challenges through the threat and application of 
organized, state-sanctioned violence at the tactical, operational, and stra-
tegic levels. Typically, in stable democratic societies, the military provides 
protection against external threats. Internal security is provided largely by 
paramilitary law enforcement groups. In post-conflict or transitional na-
tions, however, militaries are often called upon to provide security, com-
bat terrorism and insurgencies, and support the international community’s 
peace and stabilization efforts.11
Civilian companies also perform a wide variety of functions relat-
ed to the threat or application of organized, state-sponsored force to resolve 
political challenges; and they are organized to effectively do so. By adopt-
ing a corporate business model, these firms are able to recruit and retain for-
mer military personnel, develop organizational frameworks within which 
procedures, doctrine, and innovation can be produced, and, as a result, of-
fer an array of capabilities that cover the gamut of military services be-
yond mere tactical support.12 P. W. Singer distinguishes among three types 
of security businesses: military provider firms, military consultant firms, 
and military support firms that provide combat, training and advising, and 
technical support respectively.13 A recent study by Volker Franke and Marc 
von Boemcken fine-tunes this distinction, offering a five-category typology 
of armed operational combat support, armed security services, unarmed op-
erational combat support, military- or security-related advice and training, 
and military support services.14
Membership in the military profession traditionally has been lim-
ited to the uniformed personnel employed by the state. Although there is 
some debate regarding whether all military personnel are military profes-
sionals—be they officers, noncommissioned officers, career enlisted mem-
bers, conscripts, reservists of any rank, or national guardsmen—there is a 
consensus that persons who utilize or manage violence as employees of 
private entities are not members of the military profession.15
When contracted to work for government agencies, the employ-
ees of private security firms lay claim to be agents of the state, albeit in-
direct ones. According to a recent report by the Congressional Research 
Service, “Conduct that violates international obligations is attributable to 
a State if it is committed by the government of the State or any of its po-
litical subdivisions, or by any official, employee, or agent operating within 
the scope of authority of any of these governments, or under color of such 
authority.”16 Former Blackwater President Erik Prince suggests such col-
or existed for his firm: “From the beginning, these individuals [Blackwa-
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ter employees] have been bound by detailed contracts that ensure intensive 
government direction and control. The US government sets comprehensive 
standards for the selection and training of security guards. Blackwater’s 
competitively awarded contract contains dozens of pages detailing require-
ments for each position and specifying hour-by-hour training for each in-
dividual.”17 Additionally, the revenue of these firms comes primarily from 
government sources. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that direct 
US government spending on private security services in international lo-
cales was $6 billion to $10 billion over the 2003-2007 period with $3 bil-
lion to $4 billion spent in Iraq. Such expenditures rival the defense budgets 
of many nations.18
Another key aspect of the military profession is its vocational nature; 
its members are not primarily motivated by material rewards. Huntington 
argued that:
The officer is not a mercenary who transfers his services wherever 
they are best rewarded . . . . Clearly he does not act primarily from 
economic incentives. In western society the vocation of officership is 
not well rewarded monetarily. Nor is his behavior within his profes-
sion governed by economic rewards and punishments . . . . The mo-
tivations of the officer are a technical love for his craft and the sense 
of social obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society.19
Charles Moskos suggested that vocations motivated by economic re-
wards are occupations rather than professions.20 Military professionals receive 
compensation that is a function of pay grade, much of which is deferred or in 
the form of subsidies rather than cash for service.21 Clearly, by this standard, 
mercenaries “who fight for employers other than their home state’s govern-
ment [and whose] motivation for fighting is economic gain” fall outside of 
the military profession.22 Many have argued that the prospect of extraordi-
nary monetary gain serves as a central motivator for individuals to sign on 
with private security firms and engage in what we term in this context the 
“securitized management of violence.”23 Indeed, private security firms pay 
considerably higher wages than the military at the comparable skill level 
and grade.24
In modern democracies, the military profession derives legitimacy 
from its license to implement the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force in combination with its subordination to civilian command and con-
trol. For Huntington, submission of the military to civil authority is the 
sine qua non of military professionalism. Civilian professionals, by con-
trast, gain legitimacy through commitment to their employer’s or client’s 
interests.25 As employees of private firms, security contractors at best have 
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divided loyalties, answering as they do to their employer for their perfor-
mance rather than directly to their client.26
Because the military works exclusively for the state, “the commit-
ment of the professional to the client is thus changed to ‘loyalty to the nation 
and its value-system.’”27 In democracies, “society insists that the manage-
ment of violence be utilized only for socially approved purposes.”28 Be-
cause private security firms need not answer directly to the polity for their 
performance, only their shareholders and management, there are few guar-
antees that they will utilize violence only for the purposes and in the ways 
that would be socially sanctioned by the citizenry. This lack of account-
ability has been perhaps the key source of unease about the behavior of pri-
vate security firms in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly when incidents that 
involve significant harm to noncombatants come to light.
But it is not only this exclusivity arrangement based on democrat-
ic norms and values that brings legitimacy to the profession of arms. There 
is also a utilitarian calculus derived from political effectiveness and eco-
nomic efficiency that legitimizes the military as a unique social institution. 
Traditionally, a standing military has been viewed as the most efficient and 
effective solution to national security threats and challenges. This view has 
been, perhaps, the primary driver of acceptance of militaries throughout 
history, accounting (in the American case) for the high esteem in which 
military men were held after the Second World War and Operation Desert 
Storm and the low esteem in which they were held during and following 
the Vietnam War.29 In other words, effectively performing its primary mis-
sion constitutes the “special social responsibility” from which the military 
profession derives its legitimacy.
Security contractors also gain legitimacy by being politically effec-
tive and economically efficient. Singer argues that the opaqueness of their 
relationship with political authorities can increase their political utility by 
providing services that states would rather hold at arm’s length or hide 
from public view.30 Contractors also gain legitimacy from their supposed 
cost effectiveness. Indeed, the claim that private-sector actors are more ef-
ficient and effective than those employed by the public sector has been the 
primary means of legitimating the privatization movement.
Finally, members of the military profession share a corporate iden-
tity honed by their common experiences in training, education, and practice, 
When contracted to work for government agencies, 
the employees of private security firms lay claim to 
be agents of the state, albeit indirect ones. 
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as well as a command structure that controls entry into the profession, es-
tablishes polices and standards of competence, and prohibits members from 
practicing outside of its legitimate ambit. As Sir John Hackett wrote, “The 
essential basis of the military life is the ordered application of force under 
unlimited liability. It is the unlimited liability which sets the man who em-
braces this life somewhat apart. He will be (or should be) always a citizen. 
So long as he serves he will never be a civilian.”31 Military members’ behav-
ior is regulated by the UniformCodeofMilitaryJustice every moment that 
they are on active duty and even after they retire from active duty (so long 
as they do not resign their commission and elect to accept retirement pay). 
Thus, the profession continues to shape its members’ attitudes and conduct 
throughout their lifetime, thereby reinforcing its corporate identity.
A case could be made that civilian employees of private security 
firms also share an identity with the military. Many employees are former 
members of the military (136 respondents or 61.5 percent in our sample), 
and some are retirees who retain their commission and theoretically could 
be recalled to active duty. They may belong to the private associations 
of their former service and feel a kinship to their active-duty colleagues. 
Apart from this military kinship, some firms quite carefully recruit, train, 
and even indoctrinate their employees to inculcate a professional identity. 
On the other hand, there is a prima facie case to be made that employees 
of the security industry do not and likely cannot share a corporate culture 
given the diversity of firms, clients, and the eligible labor pool. “It is es-
timated that some 50 private security contractors employing more than 
30,000 employees are working in Iraq for an array of clients, including 
governments, private industry, and international organizations such as the 
United Nations.”32 There are a multitude of private security firms. Many 
are characterized by a cadre structure with a relatively low number of full-
time employees and a reservoir of expertise that can be called upon on a 
contract basis. Such a structure would appear to undermine any attempt to 
indoctrinate these employees or to foster a professional, corporate identity. 
Franke and Boemcken argue that the nature of the tasks to be performed 
encourages small-group cohesion but not necessarily the development of 
a distinct professional identity. Instead, contractors of similar background 
tend to cluster together, such as those with law-enforcement or special-op-
eration experience, and are wary about interacting with people from other 
career fields.33 Unlike the military, there is no enforced conformity in all 
aspects of life for civilian contractors over an extended period of time that 
could forge a common identity.
Civilian contractors have many of the traits of military profession-
als; they possess expert knowledge to manage organized violence, apply it 
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within the military’s jurisdiction, are primarily agents of the state although 
not directly employed by it, and gain legitimacy through provision of ef-
fective solutions to their client’s problems. On the other hand, they are not 
uniformed agents of the state, are motivated by compensation rather than 
social obligation, and have divided loyalties and a questionable corporate 
identity. Despite these obstacles, is there an emerging professional self-
conception among security contractors? How do contractors view their pro-
fessional status and relationship with traditional military forces? How do 
military professionals view contractors? We address these questions in the 
next section.
Analysis and Findings
The growing complexity of contemporary peace and stability opera-
tions that sparked the rise of the private security industry has challenged the 
military to expand its task portfolio and points out the need for increased co-
operation between military and civilian actors in post-conflict settings. These 
developments necessitate detailed analyses of the impact of the many new 
actors on mission effectiveness and the accomplishment of mission objec-
tives. An examination also is worthwhile of the relationship among those 
actors and of their motivations and perceptions of one another. To improve 
understanding of the dynamics generated by the arrival of this multitude 
of new actors, we explore and compare the attitudes of military officers to 
those of security contractors and examine how they view each other, their 
roles, and professional status. This section presents the results of empiri-
cal research conducted at the Air University and among members of an 
association of police officers who have experience in post-conflict envi-
ronments as employees of private security firms.
TheOfficerSample
Military officers have been the focus of expansive research in the 
field of civil-military relations since World War II. Attendance in a resi-
dent professional military education (PME) program has proven to be a re-
liable institutional indicator of an officer’s potential for advancement into 
the ranks of the elite.34 In August and September 2008, we surveyed US 
officers attending intermediate, advanced, and senior PME programs in 
residence at the Air Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Air 
and Space Studies, and Air War College.35 In all, we analyzed the views 
of 160 officers (sums may differ from 160 due to nonresponses on some 
questions).36 Respondents included 135 men and 13 women; one captain, 
70 majors or lieutenant commanders, 56 lieutenant colonels or command-
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ers, and 21 colonels or Navy captains. Components represented were 142 
active-duty members, seven reservists, and seven national guardsmen. Most 
respondents (111) had been in combat, and 30 had not. Breakdown by ser-
vice was 126 Air Force officers, 17 Army, 12 Navy, and two Marine Corps.
TheCivPolSample
Because of contractual prohibitions, we were not able to survey con-
tractors currently deployed in stability operations. The CivPol Alumni Asso-
ciation, a nonprofit group founded in 2007 to “promote the accomplishments 
of American police officers serving in post-conflict environments through-
out the world,” agreed to solicit volunteers from among its members to 
complete the Security Contractor Survey.37 Active members of the asso-
ciation are typically American police officers who have completed at least 
one tour of duty on contract in a conflict region. Usually, these police of-
ficers receive a leave of absence from their regular jobs and are recruited 
by the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs to participate in international civilian police activities 
and local police development programs around the world.
All 1,400 active members received an e-mail from the association 
president with a request to complete the Internet-based Security Contractor 
Survey at their convenience. This approach ensured respondent anonymity. 
Between March and May of 2009, 355 CivPol Alumni Association members 
responded to at least part of the survey.38 In all, 223 respondents answered 
every question on the survey and were included in our response sample.
All respondents in the CivPol sample were US citizens with a law- 
enforcement background. The vast majority were male (216 or 96.9 percent), 
white (77.5 percent), and married (77.1 percent). All respondents had com-
pleted at least high school (34.5 percent), almost half (49.8 percent) held 
undergraduate degrees, and 15.7 percent had graduate degrees. Almost two-
thirds (136 or 61.5 percent) had served in the military, and four-fifths of those 
(108) had been directly involved in combat. Of the respondents with a mili-
tary background, almost all had served as enlisted personnel (95 percent), 
and nearly three-fourths were discharged at the grade of E-4 through E-6 (71 
percent). At the time of survey administration, respondents had an average 
of 4.7 years of experience working for the private security industry, with a 
median of three years. Two-thirds of respondents (65.5 percent) stated that 
Security contractors also gain legitimacy by being 
politically effective and economically efficient. 
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they or their company worked on contract for the US government, while 56 
(25.1 percent) stated their company worked for an international organization. 
About one-quarter of respondents (23.7 percent) had less than two years of 
private security work experience, 44.9 percent had worked two to five years, 
23.7 percent five to ten years, and 7.7 percent had worked for more than ten 
years in the private security sector. Almost one-third of respondents (69 or 
30.9 percent) reported that their job required them to “engage in actual fight-
ing/security detail or security protection,” and more than three-quarters (171 
or 76.7 percent) reported providing advisory and training services (multi-
ple responses were possible to this question).
TheResults
To determine mutual and self-perceptions of officers and contractors, 
we focused our analysis on the motivations individuals had for joining pri-
vate security firms and how they perceived their professional status and that 
of the military. Similarly, we asked the military officers for individual views 
of their status and their attitudes toward civilian contractors. Respondents in 
the CivPol sample were asked to indicate in order of priority motivations for 
seeking employment with a security firm from a set of nine predetermined 









To face and meet new challenges. 74.9 20.8 4.3
To help others. 64.6 24.1 11.3
To feel like my work makes a difference. 38.0 37.1 24.9
To serve my country. 31.3 34.1 34.6
To make more money than in my previous job. 25.2 44.1 30.6
For personal growth. 22.0 33.9 44.0
To seek adventure and excitement. 19.1 35.4 45.5
To improve my chances of finding a better job. 13.1 36.7 50.2
To travel and visit new places. 11.3 32.1 56.6
            Figure 1. Motivators for Seeking Employment in the Security Sector (in percent)
Winter2009-10 97
For the purpose of this analysis, we aggregated responses and clas-
sified a respondent’s top three choices as “very important,” choices four 
to six as “important,” and the last three choices as “less or not important.” 
The results indicate that by far the most-cited reasons for working in the 
security sector were to “face and meet new challenges” (74.9 percent) and 
to “help others” (64.6 percent). About one-third of respondents hoped that 
their work would make a difference (38  percent) and saw their contractor 
service as a way to serve their country (31.3 percent). In contrast to expec-
tations raised in part by media reporting about the security industry, only 
one-quarter (25.2 percent) of respondents indicated that they were motivat-
ed to “make more money than in their previous job.” These results show 
that neither profit nor selfless service to the nation is the primary motiva-
tor of civilian contractors.
These findings are consistent with other recent research on the mo-
tivations of security contractors. Jeremy Scahill, author of a book on Black-
water, also found that signing on with the security industry was not all about 
the pay. Contracting, he concluded, offered “a chance for many combat en-
thusiasts, retired from the service and stuck in the ennui of everyday ex-
istence, to return to their glory days on the battlefield under the banner 
of the international fight against terrorism.”39 A former Navy SEAL ex-
plained, “It’s what you do. Say you spent 20 years doing things like rid-
ing high-speed boats and jumping out of airplanes. Now, all of a sudden, 
you’re selling insurance. It’s tough.” For a 55-year-old police officer, the 
decision to sign on with Blackwater meant “the last chance in my life to 
do something exciting.”40
Figure 2 shows the responses of participants in both segments of 
the survey to a series of statements with which they indicated their level of 
agreement or disagreement. We began our analysis with an assessment of re-
spondents’ perception regarding the exclusivity of the military’s roles and 
functions by asking whether “certain functions performed by military per-
sonnel” could, in principle, not “be performed by a civilian contractor.” This 
question was designed to tap their judgment of the boundaries of the mili-
tary profession as well as its permeability: Are there no tasks or functions 
that are inherently military in nature and must be performed by uniformed 
and professional agents of the state? Unsurprisingly, almost nine-in-ten offi-
cers (88.8 percent) disagreed with this statement, indicating an overwhelm-
ing view that military professionals possess exclusive expertise that cannot 
be substituted through outsourcing. By contrast, fewer than two-thirds (65.9 
percent) of contractors believed that the fulfillment of military functions was 
the exclusive prerogative of state soldiers.
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There are no functions performed by military 
personnel that, in principle, cannot be performed by a 
civilian contractor.
27.4 65.9 8.8 88.8
There are certain functions performed by military 
personnel that should never be performed by a civilian 
contractor.
78.0 13.9 95.6 3.8
Civilian contractors do their jobs more effectively than 
uniformed personnel could. 20.2 49.3 3.1 76.3
Civilian contractors performing in combat roles should 
be regarded as military professionals. 51.4 26.1 32.3 47.5
Civilian contractors employed by the enemy in 
a combat zone should be regarded as unlawful 
combatants.
39.2 41.9 36.3 45.6
The use of civilian contractors in combat roles is 
compatible with military ethos. 46.0 26.6 15.0 61.9
Civilian contractors performing in combat support 
roles should be regarded as military professionals. 51.1 27.8 N/A N/A
Civilian contractors deployed abroad should be 
protected by the same international treaties as the 
armed forces.
89.7 4.5 N/A N/A
Figure 2. Perceptions of Professional Status 
Asking the obverse, “that certain functions performed by military per-
sonnel should never be performed by a civilian contractor,” confirmed those 
views, particularly with respect to the professional self-conception of officers. 
Nearly all officers (95.6 percent) agreed with this statement, but so also did 
more than three-quarters (78 percent) of contractors. Thus, a great majority 
in both samples agreed that there are core functions that should only be per-
formed by uniformed military personnel. For the officer sample, we probed 
a little further using an open-ended question to elicit the specific functions 
that officers believed should not be performed by civilian contractors. Of 
those officers who responded to this question (N = 87), the majority (58) 
were concerned primarily with use-of-force issues, particularly combat. As 
one officer put it, “The exercise of war violence should never be done by ci-
vilians. This delegitimizes the role of organized militaries, lowering us to 
the same shadowy practices we seek to eradicate by fighting terrorists.” Al-
most as if to support this point, another wrote, “Any function that involves 
direct contact with the local population in combat in support of a military 
mission should never be contracted out unless the contractors become sub-
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ject to [the Uniform Code of Military Justice]. Seen too many contractors 
get away with killing or beating civilians.” Another eight officers indicat-
ed that civilian contractors should not be permitted in a combat zone, or 
“outside the wire.” Overall, three-fourths of those officers who responded 
to this question (66 out of 87) suggested that combat, the core competency 
of the military profession, is no place for civilians. Other exclusive func-
tions mentioned included command of military forces, control of nuclear 
weapons, and combat search and rescue.
Given officers’ perception of security contractors, it is surprising 
that one-third (32.3 percent) thought that “civilian contractors performing in 
combat roles should be regarded as military professionals.” This question 
directly addressed whether these officers believed possessing the knowl-
edge and ability to engage in combat is sufficient to deem a person a mili-
tary professional. Survey results indicate that almost half of officers (47.5 
percent) believe that direct employment as part of the state’s uniformed 
military services was a necessary condition to be considered a military 
professional, while one-fifth were ambivalent. This margin indicates a 
functional acceptance of contractors in a combat role. By contrast, a slight 
majority of contractors felt that contractors performing combat (51.4 per-
cent) or combat support duties (51.1 percent) should be regarded as mili-
tary professionals. Slightly more than one-quarter (26.1 percent) disagreed 
with respect to combat duties. It is clear that for this group function is 
more important than other aspects in determining professional status.
Stretching the issue of professional boundaries a bit further, we 
asked about the Bush Administration’s policy that defined individuals who 
are not members of a state-sponsored military but engage in combat against 
American forces as “unlawful combatants.”41 On the face of it, civilians 
who engage in combat on behalf of a private employer, such as security 
contractors, would meet the definition of an unlawful combatant. Conse-
quently, we asked respondents whether they thought “civilian contractors 
employed by the enemy in a combat zone should be regarded as unlawful 
combatants.” Respondents in both samples seemed split in their opinion on 
this issue. Forty percent of contractors agreed (39.2 percent) or disagreed 
(41.9 percent), while more than one-third of officers (36.3 percent) agreed 
and almost half (45.2 percent) disagreed; these differences were not sta-
tistically significant. The fact that there was no clear consensus among re-
spondents in our samples on the question of whether contractors in combat 
roles are “unlawful combatants” may be a result of the application of an 
ambiguous and widely unpopular legal term to a range of emerging and in-
creasingly important international actors. The divided nature of responses 
to this statement indicates the need to further codify the booming private 
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security industry and to resolve the continuing ambiguity with respect to 
the international legal status of individual contractors and the industry as a 
whole. The contractors would welcome further inclusion into formal agree-
ments. Nine-in-ten (89.7 percent) indicated that “civilian contractors should 
be protected by the same international treaties as the armed forces.”
In the aftermath of the September 2007 Blackwater shootings of 17 
Iraqi civilians, formal mechanisms to regulate the industry and the behav-
ior of individual contractors have tightened considerably, although none 
extend the desired protections of international law to contractors. The De-
partments of State and Defense increased their oversight and authority 
over armed security contractors in Iraq. In January 2009, the Iraqi govern-
ment revoked the immunity of contractors with respect to local law, thus 
making it theoretically possible for Iraqi authorities to criminally prose-
cute security contractors for unlawful behavior. These developments indi-
cate recognition of the need for change in the legal and political regulation 
of the industry.
Finally, the outsourcing of combat functions to the private sec-
tor cuts to the heart of military professionalism, calls into question what it 
means to be a soldier, and diffuses traditional notions of a warrior identity. 
To assess their view on the exclusivity of the military’s professional hall-
mark, namely the application of violence for national security purposes, we 
asked respondents in both samples whether they thought “the use of civilian 
contractors in combat roles is compatible with the military ethos.” While 
the majority of officers (61.9 percent) judged civilians in combat roles to be 
incompatible with the military ethos (only 15 percent judged them compat-
ible), almost half of contractors (46 percent) thought their involvement in 
combat was compatible.
Conclusion
In light of the growing importance of private security contractors as 
contributing actors to peace and stability operations, we examined the mili-
tary-contractor relationship in some detail. Specifically, we explored the mo-
tivations of individuals who become employees of private security firms, 
compared the attitudes of military officers to those of security contractors, 
When contracted to work for government 
agencies, the employees of private security 
firms lay claim to be agents of the state, albeit 
indirect ones.
Winter2009-10 101
and examined how the two groups view each other, their roles, and profes-
sional status.
Overall, our findings suggest that the boundaries of the military pro-
fession are being challenged by the outsourcing of more and more function-
al tasks that had hitherto been performed by military personnel. Contracting 
out support functions in particular had somewhat stemmed the civilianiza-
tion of the military42 and allowed it to focus more on its core function, the 
management and application of violence in support of the political aims 
of the state. The use of civilian contractors as armed security guards, op-
erational planners, and participants in raids by special operations forces,43 
however, suggests that the outsourcing trend now endangers the basic te-
nets of the military profession itself.
The results of our survey indicate that officers are well aware of this 
threat to their professional self-conception. Officers in the sample clear-
ly delineated the functional boundaries of, and membership in, their profes-
sion, clearly judging that certain (military) functions can only be performed 
by military professionals. Yet, while most officers indicated that civilians in 
combat roles were incompatible with military ethos, they displayed both ve-
hemence and ambivalence toward the professional status of contractors in 
such roles. Seventy-five percent indicated that civilians should not engage 
in combat, yet more than a quarter of officers defined civilian contractors 
performing combat roles as military professionals. Less than half (47.5 per-
cent) rejected professional status for contractors. These mixed outcomes in-
dicate that officers may place excessive emphasis on functional expertise as 
the primary definer of professional status. The survey results also show that 
officers’ corporate identity may be as vulnerable to the challenges posed by 
private military companies as their jurisdiction.44
Our sample of civilian contractors indicates that this challenge will 
continue to be present: a majority judged that they should be regarded as 
military professionals. In addition, a large plurality of contractors felt their 
engagement in combat roles was compatible with military ethos even though 
a majority of them agreed with the officers that certain military functions 
should never be performed by a civilian contractor. These results highlight 
a desire for the development and recognition of a professional identity in 
the security industry. Given that armed contractors possess expertise in the 
application and management of organized violence, have acted as agents of 
the US government, and provide cost-effective solutions to problems within 
the traditional jurisdiction of the military profession, they may have a claim 
to status as military professionals. Indeed, a recent Defense Science Board 
report repeatedly characterized contractors as the “fifth force provider in 
addition to the four services,”45 and military sociologists David Segal and 
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Karin De Angelis have argued for a “broader . . . definition of who consti-
tutes the profession” that would also include contractors.46
The fragmented nature of the industry, its multitude of firms, hetero-
geneous labor pool, and difficulties in forging a common corporate identity 
through coherent and consistent indoctrination, training, and educational ex-
periences suggests, however, that armed contractors should at best be con-
sidered to be members of a semi-profession.47 Incorporating contractors into 
the military profession would dilute its corporate identity, its dedication to 
a common good, its ability to control members’ entry, promotion, and exit, 
and would cripple the legitimacy of the armed forces as clearly demarcated 
and legal agents of the state.
Still, responses to the survey clearly indicate a sense of frustration 
among contractors regarding the existing lack of codification of the in-
dustry and, as a result, the lack of standardized professional norms guid-
ing their behavior in the field. We found the majority of contractors not 
to be motivated primarily by financial gain. Instead, most were motivat-
ed by a desire to “face and meet new challenges” and to “help others.” 
Previous research on the attitudes of security contractors has found that 
many are highly committed to professional norms and ethical standards of 
democratic societies. The vast majority of contractors surveyed supported 
the ethical standards put forth by the industry’s trade organization, the In-
ternational Peace Operations Association “Code of Conduct.”48 These data 
points all indicate that continued professionalization of the industry is pos-
sible and should be encouraged, especially by the Department of Defense, 
security firms, and employees.
The results of our preliminary research using small and fairly homo-
geneous samples representing elite military officers and the private security 
industry indicate the need to more specifically define the operational and le-
gal functions and responsibilities of the private security industry and to limit 
the outsourcing of core military functions to noncombat roles. Outsourcing 
support roles could enhance the professionalism of the US military, but the 
concept of armed contractors on the battlefield poses a strong challenge to 
the military’s professional identity and jurisdiction. This challenge and the 
judgments of our samples indicate that professional military education has 
to more effectively address the shape and requirements of the military pro-
fession, at least in the Air Force and likely across sister-service curricula 
Security contractors also gain legitimacy by being 
politically effective and economically efficient. 
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as well. We also recommend enhanced joint training to improve the coop-
eration between the military and the armed and unarmed private sector. Fi-
nally, future research should explore this relationship in greater detail and 
examine the merits and effectiveness of contractor-military cooperation in 
post-conflict contingencies.
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